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Theory of Practice*

Derek Robbins


Introduction
Inevitably, central to this chapter is Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice (Bourdieu, 1977b) which was a translation and revision of Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique, précédé de trois études d’ethnologie kabyle (Bourdieu, 1972).  Before coming to an assessment of the ‘theory’ which Bourdieu advanced in these two texts, however, there is the need to interpret some aspects of his social and intellectual trajectory in the first 40 years of his life (1930-70).  This chapter will also consider the importance of Le métier de sociologue (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1968), translated as The Craft of Sociology (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1991b) and comment on the relationship between Bourdieu’s thinking and that of Bachelard, Althusser and Habermas amongst others.

Social and Intellectual Trajectory.
As if reaffirming his normal reluctance to divulge details of his upbringing, it was only at a late stage of his posthumously published Esquisse pour une auto-analyse (Bourdieu, 2004) that Bourdieu finally articulated an account of his origins, devoting several pages to description of both of his parents.  As outlined in chapter 2, we know that his father was the son of a ‘métayer’ – a farmer holding land on condition that half the produce is given to the landlord – who, at the age of about 30, when Bourdieu was born, became a postman, and then the postmaster, in a small village about 20 kilometres south of Pau in the Béarn in the direction of the omnipresent barrier of the Pyrenees dominating the sky-line.  Bourdieu talks of his childhood experience as the ‘transfuge fils de transfuge’ (Bourdieu, 2004: 109).  His father seemed to be a ‘transfuge’ – an apostate, deserter, or betrayer of his class origins – because he had renounced farmwork and manual labour.  According to Bourdieu, his father was separated from his own father and brother both of whom remained in farmwork, although his father would go to give a hand (literally ‘donner des coups de main’, Bourdieu, 2004: 111) at busy farm periods during his own holidays.  Bourdieu suggests that his father showed signs of suffering from this social separation.

Bourdieu’s father could be said to be a ‘transfuge’ in that he had become socially mobile, but Bourdieu recalled that his father voted on the Left and was a trade-unionist in an essentially conservative rural community.  His father admired Robespierre, Jaurès, Léon Blum, and Edouard Herriot – figures who Bourdieu describes as, ‘incarnations of the scholarly and republican ideal which he wanted to make me share’ (Bourdieu, 2004: 112).  Roderick Kedward, in La Vie en bleu: France and the French since 1900 (Kedward, 2005), takes Jaurès as the archetype for the 20th century of the socialist republican tradition which, in his narrative, he represents as struggling for ideological survival in French politics and society through to Mitterrand and beyond.  Kedward says of Jaurès that ‘Reason, justice and humanism had their most eloquent secular defender in the Socialist deputy Jean Jaurès, …’ (Kedward, 2005: 13) and he proceeds to quote a speech given by Jaurès in Albi in South-West France in 1903 in which, ‘Jaurès put forward a confident vision of a vast republican venture in social co-operation, which would ‘reconcile freedom with the rule of law’ and would enable people to ‘fight for their rights without tearing each other apart’​[1]​.’ (Kedward, 2005: 13).  There is a slight ambiguity in Bourdieu’s comment that figures such as Jaurès embodied the ideal that his father wanted to make him share (‘voulait me faire partager’) because it is not clear whether he is saying that his father wanted him to share the ideal or to participate in its implementation, partake of its opportunities and benefits.  There is a sense in which Bourdieu felt himself to have been a double transfuge, betraying the egalitarian ideals of a socially mobile father, precisely because the actuality of his education betrayed the hopes which had been invested in the schooling system by Jaurès and followers like his father.

In spite of the attempts to reform the schooling system made in the late 1930s by Jean Zay as Minister of Education in Léon Blum’s socialist government, the interruption caused by the war (and Zay’s assassination by the milice in 1944) meant that the structure of educational institutions remained largely as it had been described by Goblot in 1930 in La Barrière et le niveau (the text of a normalien cited by Bourdieu in ‘Systèmes d’enseignement et systèmes de pensée’, 1971a/1967) when he said that the main function of the baccalaureate - which could only be obtained within lycées – was:

… to create a gap difficult to cross and to unite on the level of equality to all who cross.
(Goblot, 1930: 128, quoted in Talbott, 1969: 18)

For Bourdieu, therefore, education was experienced as a mechanism for consolidating social separation.  This separation was reinforced by the language of instruction which was French as opposed to the Béarnais dialect familiar to Bourdieu from his home environment​[2]​. In Esquisse pour une auto-analyse Bourdieu recalled his time at school in graphic detail as a period of incarceration, contained within a huge, 17th century classical building with long corridors and no refuges for privacy (Bourdieu, 2004: 117).  It was a regimented existence and, in his recollection, Bourdieu had recourse to Goffman’s notion of ‘total institutions’ to suggest comparison with other asylums, such as prisons or psychiatric hospitals (Bourdieu, 2004: 119).  The pedagogy and the curriculum were of a piece with this controlling ethos.  Bourdieu underwent a process of initiation into classical studies in a way which was still reminiscent of the tradition of Jesuit colleges.  All his life he was fluent in Latin and he was manifestly at ease in his analyses of scholastic discourse in his ‘postface’ to his translation of Panofsky’s Gothic Architecture and Scholastic Thought (Bourdieu, 1967b).  His adoption of the concept of habitus was, accordingly, not at all linguistically pretentious.

In conversation with Loic Wacquant, Bourdieu reflected that his experience as a boarder may have given him an affinity with Flaubert who had a similar experience and he also wondered whether it might have engendered a comparably compensatory capacity to empathize sociologically with the different life experiences of other people (Bourdieu & Wacquant,1992a: 205), but my main point is more formal than this:  Bourdieu’s educational experience instilled in him a lasting ambivalence about the function and status of objective knowledge.  The ideal, shared with his father, was that education was the means to achieve an inclusive society, but the actuality was that he imbibed a cognitive culture which procured him ‘distinction’, potentially elevating him above the processes of mass democratisation.  

In an interview of 1985 with Axel Honneth (at that time Habermas’s research assistant) and others, published as ‘Fieldwork in Philosophy’ in Choses dites/ In Other Words (Bourdieu, 1994d/ 87), Bourdieu gave an account of some of the main intellectual influences on his thinking when he was a student.  As noted in chapter 2, and to summarise briefly, Bourdieu claimed that he had been influenced by a sequence of French philosophers and historians of science and also by some reading of Husserl.  The first of these influences was reflected in the diplôme d’études supérieures which he wrote under the supervision of Henri Gouhier (an historian of philosophy) – a translation of and critical commentary on Leibniz’s critique of the general part of Descartes’s Principles (the first part of which is ‘on the principles of human knowledge’ and the second part of which is entitled ‘on the principles of material things’)​[3]​.  The second of these influences was reflected in the proposed title for the doctoral research which Bourdieu proposed, but never pursued, to be supervised by Georges Canguilhem:  ‘Les structures temporelles de la vie affective’ (the temporal structures of affective life). What we can say tentatively is that Bourdieu came to the study of the philosophy of knowledge through meticulous reflection on the relationship between two of the dominant pre-Kantian rationalist philosophers both of whom differently sought to preserve metaphysics by reconciling the legacy of scholastic thought, dependent on a priori reasoning, with the knowledge claims of the new sciences, dependent on empirical observation and experience.  Most of the historians and philosophers of science mentioned by Bourdieu as influences on his own thinking – Duhem, Koyré, Vuillemin, Bachelard, Guéroult – were involved in considering the extent to which Kant’s resolution of the conflict between rationalists and empiricists in respect of the grounds of our knowledge of the external world in his ‘critical’ philosophy might be adapted to pertain to science. 

Kant had famously argued at the beginning of the Introduction (‘1.  Of the difference between pure and empirical cognition’) of the Critique of Pure Reason (1st edn.: 1781; 2nd edn: 1787) that

… although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience.  For it could well be that even our experiential cognition is a composite of that which we receive through impressions and that which our own cognitive faculty … provides out of itself …
 (Kant, ed. Guyer & Wood, 1997: 136)

This compromise between the extreme claims of rationalism and empiricism gave rise in post-Kantian and neo-Kantian thought in the 19th century to dispute whether the input of the ‘cognitive faculty’ should be thought to possess universal and a-historical, logical or particular and historical, psychological characteristics.  Bachelard wanted to argue that science advances through the construction and verification of hypotheses, a process of what he called ‘applied rationalism’.  He developed an ‘historical epistemology’ which emphasized that the dialectic between reason and observation is instrumental and that rational construction is always the historically contingent product of changing social and economic conditions. On the other hand, Cassirer began to emphasize the significance for the philosophy of science of Kant’s Critique of Judgement more than his Critique of Pure Reason, developing a philosophy of symbolic forms which attempted to describe the historical emergence of competing discourses – myths, art, religion, philosophy, science – as objectified manifestations of a prioristic judgement rather than concentrating on the universal characteristics of a prioristic pure reason​[4]​.

 For Neo-Kantianism, philosophy and epistemology had become virtually synonymous.  The young Emmanuel Levinas spent the year 1928-9 at Freiburg where he was admitted to Heidegger’s seminar. In 1930, he published one of the first French discussions of the work of Husserl - Théorie de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl, (Levinas, 1930). He argued that the achievement of Husserl and Heidegger was that they had reasserted the philosophical primacy of ontology – the philosophy of being – and had pioneered attempts to liberate the experience of being from the straitjacket of epistemological comprehension.  Levinas called the epistemological approach to being ‘naturalism’ and elaborated his meaning in the following way:

… naturalism conceives the existence of the whole of being on the model of material things.  It understands the manner of appearing and of being revealed of the whole of being in the same way as it understands that of a material thing.
 (Levinas, 1973: 12)

The origin of Husserl’s phenomenology had been a rejection of psychologism and a desire to make the analysis of logic itself the basis of a science of thought.  Husserl’s early transcendental phenomenology can be seen to have been an extension from Kant’s transcendental idealism in opposition to the psychologism of the Marburg neo-Kantians (Natorp, Cohen and Cassirer).  It was different, however, in rejecting the naturalism of the epistemological tradition. Ricoeur published a translation of Husserl’s Ideen I, with a detailed translator’s introduction, in 1950 – the year in which Bourdieu commenced study at the Ecole Normale Supérieure.  Ricoeur’s philosophical exegesis was an attempt to distinguish Husserl’s transcendental idealism both from Cartesian a priorism and from Kantian transcendental idealism.  Ricoeur argued that ‘Husserl’s ‘question’ … is not Kant’s;  Kant poses the problem of validity for possible objective consciousness and that is why he stays within the framework of an attitude which remains natural.  … Husserl’s question … is the question of the origin of the world …; it is, if you like, the question implied in myths, religions, theologies and ontologies, which has not yet been elaborated scientifically’ (Husserl, int. Ricoeur, 1950: xxvii-xxviii).  At the same time that Bourdieu was reading discussions of the implications of Kant’s critical philosophy for the elaboration of a philosophy of science, Ricoeur’s exposition of Husserl opened up the possibility of which Bourdieu would have been aware, that Husserl’s work could help in attempting to analyze the foundations of Kantian a priorism.  Phenomenology was not to be understood as another philosophy but as a method for analyzing all modes of thought, including that of philosophy.  This is the origin of Bourdieu’s ‘reflexivity’ or, better, his use of the idea of ‘epistemological break’ to expose the social origins of all ‘objective’ accounts of the social. It was this interpretation of Husserl – found in Lyotard’s introduction to phenomenology of 1954 (to which Bourdieu never referred in print) – that enabled Bourdieu to make a link between the legacy of Husserl and the influence on the theory of scientific method of Bachelard’s ‘historical epistemology’.  


Bourdieu’s Work of the 1960s
It is now possible to offer an interpretative summary of some of the main components of Bourdieu’s intellectual position at the beginning of the 1960s.  This remains partial because it pays no attention, for instance, to the formative statistical and ethnographic research which Bourdieu carried out in Algeria in the late 1950s, to the influence in this work of American acculturation theorists​[5]​, to the influence of Lévi-Strauss on Bourdieu in his attempt to represent his research findings within anthropological discourse, nor, overall, to Bourdieu’s anxious efforts to produce accounts of Algerian society and Algerian social movements which were not the expressions of a colonial ‘gaze’ (see chapter 2).  However, the main issues are clear. Bourdieu felt strongly that the social function of the French education system as envisaged by the innovators of the 3rd Republic at the end of the 19th century had now become abused such that the acquisition of knowledge had become a mechanism of social division rather than solidarity.  He wanted school learning to be an instrument for social integration.  Through his own experience he had absorbed a sociological understanding of educational knowledge long before he could be said to have made a contribution to the sociology of education.  As his intellectual formation progressed within the educational system he became interested philosophically in the history and philosophy of knowledge and, more particularly, in the 20th century attempts to derive a history and philosophy of science from 17th and 18th century epistemological debates between rationalists and empiricists.  At the same time, as he came to adopt a rationalist, ‘constructivist’ orientation in opposition to crude empiricism or positivism in scientific methodology, Bourdieu’s interest in the work of Husserl led him to want to ground scientific practice in social action in the ‘life-world’ and to be sceptical about the self-fulfilling, self-legitimating abstractions of autonomous discourses of objectivity.  Within scientific practice, Bourdieu was interested in the logic of scientific discovery and also the logic of scientific explanation, but an amalgamation of the influence of Husserl and Heidegger led Bourdieu towards a desire to understand the ontological foundations of epistemology and to formulate what he might have called a socio-logic of science (by analogy with his insistence on the need for socio-linguistic analysis rather than the abstracted discourse of sociolinguistics)​[6]​.

In 1960/1, Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron were not long returned from Algeria.  Raymond Aron had been appointed professor of sociology at the Sorbonne in 1955 and had given courses of lectures on aspects of the social structure of modern, industrial society.  Sociology only became formally institutionalised within French higher education with effect from 1958/9.  Aron was eager to promote empirical research in relation to the issues which he had discussed theoretically and he was also eager to consolidate the discipline of sociology.  He appointed Passeron as his research assistant, and founded the Centre de Sociologie Européenne research group to which Bourdieu was appointed secretary.  Bourdieu and Passeron had similar backgrounds.  They both had provincial origins, had similarly experienced social division in their schooling, had gained access to the Ecole Normale Supérieure, studied philosophy and been conscripted to military service in Algeria.  Together they developed a research programme for the Centre which would explore the phenomenon of social mobility and analyse also the emergence of mass culture.  It was in the 1960s that Bourdieu, with Passeron, developed many of his ‘key’ sociological concepts, notably ‘cultural capital’, ‘habitus’ and ‘field’.  This is not the place to go into detail about this period of conceptual invention, but rather to emphasize that it evidenced an ars inveniendi within the field of sociology.  Bourdieu and Passeron were fulfilling the intentions of their mentor – Aron – in seeking to institutionalise a discipline and to establish concomitantly an autonomous conceptual discourse.  In all the practice of the work of the 1960s, however, there is also constant evidence of their interest in the epistemology of the social sciences.  The texts which they produced together – notably Les Héritiers (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964) and La Reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970) – were all meticulous in articulating the process in practice which led from the formulation of the research problem (discovery) through to the presentation of findings (explanation or, perhaps, simply understanding).  Implicitly, they were always interested in the relationship between induction and deduction, and concerned to question whether their findings were disclosing causal relations between phenomena or only expressing predispositional, a priori logical connections. Bourdieu wrote Champ intellectuel et projet créateur in 1966 (see 1971c) in which he developed an analogy with physical fields of force (see chapter 5) to show that the intellectual production of individuals, whether artists or scientists, is variably constituted by the fields within which their work is disseminated, depending on the degree of social autonomy of the field in question.  A year later, Bourdieu and Passeron published ‘Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945:  Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy without Subject’ (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1967a) in which they tried both to criticise the ‘neo-positivism’ of contemporary American sociology and to situate their own sociological creative project socio-historically within a representation of the French intellectual field in the post-World War II years.  The following year, Bourdieu published ‘Structuralism and Theory of Sociological Knowledge’ (Bourdieu, 1968) in which he argued, as the title suggests, that sociologists should be more concerned to acknowledge the epistemological status of their perceptions and observations than to develop ‘social theories’ or theories of society in abstract.  This article appeared in the same year as a collaborative venture which can still be seen to fulfill Aron’s intentions even if the implicit philosophy of social science was no longer one that he could share.

 Le métier de sociologue (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991b/ 68) was designed to be a handbook for research students.  It argued that sociology, just like any other discipline, needed to establish its own epistemic community (‘field’) and it claimed that a defining and unifying account of sociological practice could be extrapolated from the practices of canonical ‘sociologists’ (notably Durkheim, Weber, and Marx) irrespective of their ideological differences.  What was extrapolated was a methodological blueprint which was derived from Bachelard.  The handbook, which was sub-titled ‘epistemological preliminaries’, was presented in two sections, the first of which was an introductory discussion of ‘epistemology and methodology’ and the second of which was a collection of ‘illustrative texts’.  In the first section, adherence to Bachelard is early made explicit:

As the whole oeuvre of Gaston Bachelard shows, epistemology differs from abstract methodology inasmuch as it strives to grasp the logic of error in order to construct the logic of the discovery of truth as a polemic against error and as an endeavour to subject the approximated truths of science and the methods it uses to methodical, permanent rectification. … But the polemical action of scientific reason cannot be given its full force unless the ‘psychoanalysis of the scientific mind’ is taken further by an analysis of the social conditions in which sociological works are produced. 
 (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron: 1991b: 3)

Part III of the introductory section is sub-titled Applied Rationalism which directly registers allegiance to the position advanced by Bachelard in his Le rationalisme appliqué (1949).  The part elaborates the unifying formula derived from Bachelard – that ‘the social fact is won, constructed, and confirmed’, involving a ‘hierarchy of epistemological acts.’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991b: 57).  The second section of illustrative texts begins with a passage extracted from Canguilhem’s hommage to Bachelard after his death and is followed by an extract from Le rationalisme appliqué.  Each of the extracts is introduced by the editors.  In the first case, they highlight two elements of Bachelard’s approach:

This epistemology rejects the formalism and fixism of a single indivisible Reason in favour of a pluralism of rationalisms linked to the scientific domains that they rationalize.  Positing as its first axiom the ‘theoretical primacy of error’, it defines the progress of knowledge as an unceasing rectification.
 (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991b: 81).

Social scientific practice must be pluralist and continuous.  Some recognition of this contention would have eradicated so much criticism of Bourdieu which has tried to de-contextualise his work by ignoring his deliberate participation in collective activity and by ‘fixing’ his historically produced concepts in order to generate a spuriously universal falsification of them.  In the second case, the extract from Bachelard, the editors summarise what he meant by ‘the three degrees of vigilance’:

First-degree monitoring – waiting for the expected or even alertness to the unexpected – remains a posture of the empiricist mind.  Second-degree monitoring presupposes spelling out one’s methods and adopting the methodic vigilance that is essential for the methodical application of methods. … Only with third-degree monitoring does distinctively epistemological inquiry appear; and this alone can break free from the ‘absolute of method’ – the system of the ‘censures of Reason’ and from the false absolutes of the traditional culture which may still be at work in second-degree vigilance.  (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991b: 87)

Here the ‘hierarchy of epistemological acts’ is clearly linked with the assertion of the need to make ‘epistemological breaks’.

Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique/Outline of a Theory of Practice.
My interpretation of the effects of the combined early influences on Bourdieu’s thinking is that increasingly during the 1960s he felt trapped within a singular, institutionalised discourse and that, within an academic field and as an ‘intellectual’, he was betraying the primary, domestic, or familial experiences of his upbringing in the Béarn and the primary experiences that he had observed amongst the Kabyles in Algeria.  When, in 1972, he re-visited his early Algerian research, he wanted to apply Bachelard’s formula to go beyond the second-degree monitoring of some of his earlier articles towards a third-degree which would sociologically ‘situate’ the eurocentrism of his structuralist analyses.  In doing so, however, he wanted to ensure that his practice now would not simply be part of a process of consolidating the self-referentiality of an introspective and socially distinct sociological epistemic community, but, instead, a counter-transfugist action which would liberate primary experience by relativising academic objectivism.  It is significant that Bourdieu tried to go beyond his sociological practice of the 1960s by returning to his earlier anthropological perspective and by returning also to Husserl in that Bachelard’s instruments for securing an historical epistemology were transformed into procedures for phenomenological reduction.

The key passage which shows this development in Bourdieu’s approach is, of course, the passage from Esquisse which was separately published in translation in 1973 as The Three forms of Theoretical Knowledge.  In Outline of a Theory of Practice (Bourdieu, 1977a), the passage is sub-titled:  ‘From the mechanics of the model to the dialectic of strategies’.  The passage is dense and must be consulted in full but this is the sequence of Bourdieu’s thinking:

The social world may be the object of three modes of theoretical knowledge, each of which implies a set of (usually tacit) anthropological theses.  Although these modes of knowledge are strictly speaking in no way exclusive, and may be described as moments in a dialectical advance towards adequate knowledge, they have only one thing in common, the fact that they are opposed to practical knowledge.  The knowledge we shall call phenomenological … sets out to make explicit the truth of the primary experience of the social world … The knowledge we shall term objectivist … constructs the objective relations … which structure practice and representations of practice … Finally, it is only by means of a second break, which is needed in order to grasp the limits of objectivist knowledge – an inevitable moment in scientific knowledge – and to bring to light the theory of theory and the theory of practice inscribed (in its practical state) in this mode of knowledge, that we can integrate the gains from it into an adequate science of practices. (Bourdieu, 1977b: 3)

Bourdieu uses Bachelard to talk about the way in which theory must be used to recover the practice of the agents about which it theorises and, in doing so, becomes itself a practical, engaged social activity – the practice or the craft of the sociologist as one practitioner amongst a plural society of other and equal practitioners.

Conclusion
It is possible, in conclusion, to clarify what Bourdieu sought to present as a ‘theory of practice’ by reference, on the one hand, to an opposite view of ‘theory and practice’ as presented by Habermas and, on the other, to views expressed by Althusser.

The interview which took place in Paris in April, 1985, between Bourdieu and three German interviewers -  A. Honneth, H. Kocyba and B. Schwibs – to which I have already referred (‘Fieldwork in Philosophy’ in Bourdieu, 1994e/87) is an ideal place to explore a confrontation between two traditions in the philosophy of social science. In ‘The Fragmented World of Symbolic Forms (Honneth, 1984, 1986), Honneth had identified the way in which Bourdieu had become dissatisfied with Lévi-Straussian structuralism.  Having shown that Bourdieu’s anthropological researches had caused him to question structuralism, Honneth contended that these had:

… provided the impetus for him to work out his own conception, which to some extent took him back to just that type of social-scientific functionalism which Lévi-Strauss’ approach had been aimed against.
 (Honneth, in Robbins, 2000, vol. 3: 4).

What Honneth did not appear to have realized was that Bourdieu’s move away from structuralism was a move towards seeking to understand agents as themselves theory-generating agents rather than the objects of interpretation of academic social philosophers.  As Bourdieu put this in response to Honneth’s question in the 1985 interview:

… I was beginning to suspect that the privilege granted to scientific and objectivist analysis (genealogical research, for example), in dealing with the natives’ vision of things, was perhaps an ideology inherent in the profession.  In short, I wanted to abandon the cavalier point of view of the anthropologist who draws up plans, maps, diagrams and genealogies.  That is all very well, and inevitable, as one moment, that of objectivism, in the anthropologist’s procedures.  But you shouldn’t forget the other possible relation to the social world, that of agents really engaged in the market, for example – the level that I am interested in mapping out.  One must thus draw up a theory of this non-theoretical, partial, somewhat down-to-earth relationship with the social world that is the relation of ordinary experience.  And one must also establish a theory of the theoretical relationship, a theory of all the implications, starting with the breaking off of practical belonging and immediate investment, and its transformation into the distant, detached relationship that defines the scientist’s position. 
 			(Bourdieu, 1994e: 20-1)

In response to further questioning, Bourdieu was equally emphatic that he was not wanting to produce a theory of ‘praxis’:

I really must point out that I have never used the concept of praxis which, at least in French, tends to create the impression of something pompously theoretical – which is pretty paradoxical – and makes one think of trendy Marxism, the young Marx, the Frankfurt School, Yugoslav Marxism … I’ve always talked, quite simply, of practice. 
(Bourdieu, 1994e: 22)

In these responses, Bourdieu made it clear what his theory of practice was not but, in resisting any association with Marxism, he failed to acknowledge the affinity of his theory with the views which Althusser was expressing in the 1960s​[7]​.  The papers which became Lire le Capital were delivered in the course of a seminar held at the Ecole Normale Supérieure early in 1965.  In his introductory paper – ‘From ‘Capital’ to Marx’s Philosophy’ – Althusser argued that the general problem with which he was concerned (and which he was to explore with specific reference to Marxist explanation) was:

… by what mechanism does the process of knowledge, which takes place entirely in thought, produce the cognitive appropriation of its real object, which exists outside thought in the real world?
  (Althusser & Balibar, 1970, 56)

This was also Bourdieu’s general problem.  In the foreword to the second, abridged, edition of Lire Le Capital, Althusser regretted that his discussions, and those of his colleagues, were thought to be ‘structuralist’.  He sought to confirm his objections to structuralism as a form of ‘theoreticism’.  Again, this was Bourdieu’s position.  However, Althusser admitted that one of the theses that he advanced ‘did express a certain ‘theoreticist’ tendency’.  He continued:

More precisely, the definition of philosophy as a theory of theoretical practice … is unilateral and therefore inaccurate.  In this case, it is not merely a question of terminological ambiguity, but one of an error in the conception itself.  To define philosophy in a unilateral way as the Theory of theoretical practices (and in consequence as a Theory of the differences between the practices) is a formulation that could not help but induce either ‘speculative’ or ‘positivist’ theoretical effects and echoes.
 (Althusser & Balibar, 1970: 8)

Although the problem of the relationship between thought and social reality was one which concerned both Althusser and Bourdieu, it can be said that Bourdieu realised that Althusser did run the risk, of which he was aware here, of philosophizing about theory and practice.  Bourdieu proposed a practical theory of practices which meant that he could deploy Bachelard’s epistemological breaks to subject all practices, including his own sociological practice, to a third-stage sociological monitoring on a different level.

Bourdieu’s particular approach to the philosophy of the social sciences can be further illustrated by reference to the work of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch.  These two ‘philosophers in exile’ ​[8]​ were conscious that their attempts to develop a phenomenological social science were different, but complementary. 

Schutz’s Der sinnhafte Aufbau des sozialen Welt was published in Vienna in 1932.  It was re-published in German in unaltered form in 1960 and first published in English translation in 1967 as The Phenomenology of the Social World .  In this early text, Schutz attempted to refine the way in which Weber had endeavoured to analyse the ‘meaningful actions’ of social agents by deploying the notion of the ‘ideal-type’ as an exploratory instrument.  Borrowing substantially from the work of Husserl and Bergson on Time, Schutz sought to distinguish between our internal consciousness of our own actions and objective understanding which derives from social observation.  He lived a divided life – by day throughout his adult life a banker, and, by night, a philosopher. He was predominantly interested in producing a phenomenological sociology of social action.  Although he found Weber’s ‘ideal-type’ philosophically unsatisfactory, he retained Weber’s functional duality between thought and action, as expressed in the distinction  between the vocations of ‘science’ and ‘politics’.  He devoted himself to rethinking social action, but not to rethinking thought about action.

Gurwitsch was a Lithuanian Jew who studied in Germany before moving to France in 1933, and then to the United States in 1940.  His lectures in Paris in 1937 were attended by Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  In the 1920s and 1930s, he studied Gestalt psychology and was concerned with problems of cognition, perception and consciousness.  Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception of 1945 was indebted to Gurwitsch who only in 1957 published the book on which he had been working for decades.  His Théorie du champ de la conscience (1957) was published in English in 1964 as The Field of Consciousness. 

Whilst Schutz and Gurwitsch were conscious of trying to give accounts of subjective social action from opposing ends of what they described as a tunnel​[9]​ – the former in relation to action and the latter in relation to perception – I speculatively suggest​[10]​ that Bourdieu was himself trying to combine the two as he developed his thinking in the second half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s.  Bourdieu acknowledged the influence of Merleau-Ponty and also of Husserl on time.  Significantly, in 1966, he wrote (with J.D. Reynaud):  “Une sociologie de l’action est-elle possible?” [Is a sociology of action possible] (Bourdieu & Reynaud, 1966, 1974, 1966), and, in 1968, “Eléments d’une théorie sociologique de la perception” [Outline of a sociological theory of art perception] (Bourdieu, 1968b, 1968).  These were followed by his articles on Weber (Bourdieu 1971a, 1987b, 1971, and  Bourdieu, 1971b, 1991d, 1971) which preceded the articulation of his account of the ‘three forms of theoretical knowledge’ and of the notion of ‘strategic action’ in Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (Bourdieu, 1972).  Bourdieu completed the Schutz/Gurwitsch tunnel.  He attempted to advance a theory of immanent and socially constituted thought about socially constructed action.
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^1	  Jean Jaurès, ‘Discours à la jeunesse’, Albi, 1903, reprinted in Cahiers laiques, No. 30, November-December, 1955, pp. 4-11.
^2	  For Bourdieu’s general discussion of the imposition of French as an official language and for his specific commentary on the uses of Béarnais dialect, see Bourdieu, 1991a, pages 46-8 and 68-9 respectively.
^3	  Bourdieu’s translation and commentary were not published but a parallel Latin/French text can be found in Leibniz, translated P. Schrecker, 2001, 30-159.
^4	  For a more detailed discussion of Bourdieu, Cassirer and Kant, see Part II, Chapter 6 of Robbins, D.M., 2006a and Robbins, D.M., 2006b.
^5	  For some consideration of this influence, see ‘Framing Bourdieu’ Robbins, D in Edwards, T., 2007.
^6	  See Bourdieu, 1990c and Bourdieu, 1982b, passim.
^7	 
^8	   See the title of the correspondence (1939-1959) between the two men published in translation as Grathoff, ed., 1989.
^9	  See Grathoff, ed., 1989, 75
^10	  I am in the process of trying to substantiate this suggestion fully in an article on Bourdieu and phenomenology due to be published in 2012/3 in French in Cités, and I am hoping to explore these issues further in a volume which will complement my French Post-War Social Theory:  International Knowledge Transfer, due to be published by Sage before the end of  Robbins, D.M.,2011.
